Black & Davison v. Chambersburg Area School Distr by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-3-2021 
Black & Davison v. Chambersburg Area School Distr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Black & Davison v. Chambersburg Area School Distr" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 619. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/619 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





BLACK & DAVISON; JAN G. SULCOVE, Esquire; ROBERT C. SCHOLLAERT, 




CHAMBERSBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; DANA BAKER in his individual and 
official capacities; WILLIAM LENNARTZ in his individual and official capacities; 
CARL BARTON in his individual and official capacities; EDWARD NORCROSS in his 
individual and official capacities; JOAN SMITH in her individual and 
official capacities; ROBERT FLOYD in his individual and official capacities; 
MARK SCHUR in his individual and official capacities; KEVIN MINTZ in his 




On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-17-cv-688) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2021 
________________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 






CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
The law firm Black & Davison and its partners — Mark Orndorf, Robert 
Schollaert, Elliot Sulcove, Jan Sulcove, and Jerrold Sulcove (collectively, the “Black & 
Davison Plaintiffs”) — served as the District Solicitor for the Chambersburg Area School 
District (“Chambersburg”) for nearly fifty years.  Chambersburg’s Board of School 
Directors (the “School Board”) voted to terminate Black & Davison’s contract.  The 
Black & Davison Plaintiffs subsequently sued the Chambersburg Defendants,1 alleging, 
among other things, that the Chambersburg Defendants violated their First Amendment 
rights.  The District Court granted the Chambersburg Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the First Amendment claims, concluding that the Black & Davison Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to protection under the First Amendment because the District Solicitor 
position was a policymaking one.  Because we hold that there is no genuine dispute as to 
the material fact that the District Solicitor position is a policymaking position, we will 
affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1  We refer to Chambersburg, Dana Baker, William Lennartz, Carl Barton, Edward 
Norcross, Joan Smith, Robert Floyd, Mark Schur, Kevin Mintz, and Alexander Sharpe 
collectively as the “Chambersburg Defendants.” 
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I. 
We write solely for the parties’ benefit, so our summary of the facts is brief.  
Black & Davison is a Pennsylvania law firm that served as District Solicitor for 
Chambersburg from approximately 1968 to 2016.  It has five equity partners, all of whom 
are named plaintiffs in this case:  Orndorf, Schollaert, Elliot Sulcove, Jan Sulcove, and 
Jerrold Sulcove.  Apart from Schollaert, the equity partners performed solicitor duties for 
Chambersburg.  Until 2015, Chambersburg renewed Black & Davison’s appointment as 
District Solicitor every year through a School Board resolution.   
In 2015, however, the School Board voted to approve a Request for Proposal 
(“RFP”) seeking applications from law firms interested in serving as District Solicitor.  
The RFP listed the District Solicitor’s responsibilities as including, among other things:  
1) representing the School Board and Chambersburg on “detailed requirements in various 
areas of the law”; 2) “consult[ing] on personnel, labor relations, student discipline and 
general school law”; 3) interpreting and analyzing contracts; 4) representing 
Chambersburg during collective bargaining negotiations, mediations, and arbitrations; 5) 
representing Chambersburg at meetings and before the School Board on “school law 
matters, including .  .  .  employee discipline, non-renewals, reductions-in-force, 
dismissal, and expulsion hearings”; 6) representing Chambersburg in tax-related appeals; 
7) reviewing students’ records and individualized education programs; 8) meeting with 
Chambersburg’s administrators and staff; 9) making “[p]eriodic advisory 
communications on school law matters”; 10) “[r]eview[ing] and 
drafting .  .  .  correspondence and policies on school matters”; and 11) “serv[ing] as 
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spokesman for [Chambersburg] on all legal matters requiring comment to public media.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 1883.  The School Board voted to renew Black & Davison’s 
appointment as District Solicitor.  This vote took place after an election in which several 
new board members were elected but before they were sworn into office.  Chambersburg 
and Black & Davison subsequently entered into a written contract, which provided that 
Black & Davison’s appointment was to last for three years.   
The School Board has nine elected members — a President, a Vice President, and 
seven other board members.  The District Superintendent also serves on the School Board 
as a non-voting board member.  Five of the School Board’s seats were up for election in 
2015.  Two political groups — Citizens for Value and Excellence in Education (“CVEE”) 
and Common $ense (“Common Sense”) — endorsed the candidates in this election.  The 
individual plaintiffs supported the CVEE candidates and engaged in various campaign 
activities, including donating money, recruiting candidates, handing out campaign 
literature, taking constituents to the polls, hanging political signs, and vocally supporting 
CVEE and its candidates.  The Common Sense candidates, however, won all five seats.  
Because Common Sense already held three of the four seats not up for election that year, 
its victory meant that its members held a majority on the School Board.  After the new 
board members took their new seats, the School Board voted to terminate Black & 
Davison’s contract.   
The Black & Davison Plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court, asserting contract 
and First Amendment claims.  The District Court dismissed the Black & Davison 
Plaintiffs’ contract claim, a decision from which they do not appeal.  The court 
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subsequently granted the Chambersburg Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
reasoning that the District Solicitor role was a policymaking position and that the Black 
& Davison Plaintiffs were consequently not entitled to First Amendment protection.  The 
Black & Davison Plaintiffs timely appealed.2  
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 
and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review over the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United 
States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019).  We will only affirm a grant of summary 
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A “factual dispute is ‘genuine’ if 
the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.’”  Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  We must view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.  
Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 2009).  In cases involving the First 
Amendment, we “undertake exacting review of the whole record with a particularly close 
 
2  The District Court also considered the Black & Davison Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claim under the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
U.S. 563 (1968).  App. 24–27.  Because the Black & Davison Plaintiffs only addressed 
this issue in passing, Pls.’ Br. 34 n.3, they have forfeited this argument.  See Barna v. Bd. 
of Sch. Dirs., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).  They have similarly forfeited their 
argument with respect to their claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). 
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focus on facts that are determinative of a constitutional right.”  Galli v. N.J. 
Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Armour v. Cnty. of 
Beaver, 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. 
S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 975 F.3d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 2020).  
When a legal standard requires the balancing of multiple factors, summary 
judgment may be appropriate “even if not all of the factors favor one party, so long as the 
evidence so favors the movant that no reasonable juror could render a verdict against it.”  
Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting In re 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 
2012)) (quotation marks omitted).  Whether the District Solicitor position is a 
policymaking position “must be left to the jury if, on the other hand, reasonable minds 
could come to different conclusions on the issue.”  Id. 
III.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that dismissing government employees for 
their political beliefs does not violate the First Amendment when the employees hold 
policymaking positions.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976) (“Limiting patronage 
dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end.”); see 
also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).  Although “no clear line can be drawn 
between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions,” we have previously explained 
what factors courts should consider when determining whether political affiliation is a 
proper condition for a government position.  Galli, 490 F.3d at 271 (quoting Elrod, 427 
U.S. at 367) (alteration omitted).  These factors include whether the government 
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employee:  1) “has duties that are non-discretionary or non-technical,” 2) “participates in 
discussions or other meetings,” 3) “prepares budgets,” 4) “possesses the authority to hire 
and fire other employees,” 5) “has a high salary,” 6) “retains power over others,” and 7) 
“can speak in the name of policymakers.”  Id.  
Whether a position is a policymaking position is an “inherently fact-specific” 
question because courts must examine the nature of the position’s responsibilities.  
Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383–84 (3d Cir. 1998).  This inquiry focuses on “the 
function of the public office in question and not the actual past duties of the particular 
employee involved,” although “evidence of past job duties may in some cases be 
informative.”  Id. at 384 (quoting Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
The parties dispute whether the District Solicitor position is a policymaking 
position for which party affiliation is a proper condition.  Construing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Black & Davison Plaintiffs, we conclude that there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact that the District Solicitor position is a policymaking position and 
that the Chambersburg Defendants were thus entitled to summary judgment.  
The District Solicitor has discretionary duties, which include, inter alia, drafting 
policies, advising the School Board on various school-related issues, and representing 
Chambersburg on matters including employee discipline.  These duties necessarily 
require the District Solicitor to exercise its professional judgment, meaning that the first 
Galli factor is easily satisfied.  Indeed, Black & Davison’s contract with Chambersburg 
explicitly provided that Black & Davison would “be free to exercise its own independent 
professional judgment in matters requiring legal expertise.”  App. 647.   
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The District Solicitor additionally participates in discussions and other meetings, 
so the second factor similarly supports concluding that the District Solicitor position is a 
policymaking one.  The District Solicitor, however, does not prepare Chambersburg’s 
budget, meaning that the third factor is not met here, even though the District Solicitor 
does represent Chambersburg in tax-related matters.  The fourth factor — whether the 
District Solicitor can hire or fire employees — is also not met here, but the District 
Solicitor does retain power over others, given that it represents Chambersburg on matters 
including, inter alia, employee discipline.  Black & Davison’s recommendation that the 
School Board censure a board member and drafting of the censuring documents provide 
further evidence of how the District Solicitor retains power over others, which means that 
the sixth factor is present.  The District Solicitor also receives a high salary, given that 
Black & Davison’s contract provided that it would receive between $130 and $135 per 
hour, reimbursement for certain expenses, an additional $15,000 per financing or 
refinancing project, and an annual, non-refundable $60,000 retainer.  Finally, as 
Chambersburg’s representative, the District Solicitor can speak in the name of 
policymakers.   
The indisputable presence of all but two of the Galli factors makes clear that the 
position of District Solicitor is a policymaking position for which political affiliation is 
an appropriate precondition.  See Galli, 490 F.3d at 271.  Even though not all of the 
factors support the Chambersburg Defendants, summary judgment was appropriate 
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because the “evidence ‘so favors’ the [Chambersburg Defendants] that ‘no reasonable 
juror’ could render a verdict against [them].”3  Faush, 808 F.3d at 215.4 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order. 
 
3  The Black & Davison Plaintiffs, citing our decision in Boyle v. County of 
Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1998), argue that the District Court erred in not 
considering former School Board members’ affidavits and the District Superintendent’s 
testimony in which they asserted that political affiliation is not a requirement for the 
District Solicitor position.  The Black & Davison Plaintiffs’ reliance on Boyle is 
misplaced.  In Boyle, we held that testimony by two out of three members of a hiring 
authority stating that a position did not require political affiliation created a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether the position was a policymaking one.  Id. at 397, 401.  In 
contrast, no member of the School Board with hiring authority testified that the District 
Solicitor position did not or should not require political affiliation. 
4  We have considered all other arguments the Black & Davison Plaintiffs made and 
conclude that they are without merit.  
